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Summary
Background: Optimal choices require an accurate neuronal
representation of economic value. In economics, utility func-
tions are mathematical representations of subjective value
that can be constructed from choices under risk. Utility usually
exhibits a nonlinear relationship to physical reward value that
corresponds to risk attitudes and reflects the increasing or
decreasing marginal utility obtained with each additional unit
of reward. Accordingly, neuronal reward responses coding
utility should robustly reflect this nonlinearity.
Results: In two monkeys, we measured utility as a function
of physical reward value from meaningful choices under risk
(that adhered to first- and second-order stochastic domi-
nance). The resulting nonlinear utility functions predicted
the certainty equivalents for new gambles, indicating that
the functions’ shapes were meaningful. The monkeys were
risk seeking (convex utility function) for low reward and risk
avoiding (concave utility function) with higher amounts. Criti-
cally, the dopamine prediction error responses at the time of
reward itself reflected the nonlinear utility functions measured
at the time of choices. In particular, the reward response
magnitude depended on the first derivative of the utility
function and thus reflected the marginal utility. Furthermore,
dopamine responses recorded outside of the task reflected
the marginal utility of unpredicted reward. Accordingly, these
responses were sufficient to train reinforcement learning
models to predict the behaviorally defined expected utility
of gambles.
Conclusions: These data suggest a neuronal manifestation of
marginal utility in dopamine neurons and indicate a common
neuronal basis for fundamental explanatory constructs in ani-
mal learning theory (prediction error) and economic decision
theory (marginal utility).Introduction
The St. Petersburg paradox famously demonstrated that eco-
nomic choices could not be predicted from physical value.
Bernoulli’s enduring solution to this paradox illustrated that
decision makers maximized the satisfaction gained from
reward, rather than physical value (wealth) [1]. In modern eco-
nomic theory, the concept of satisfaction was demystified and
formalized as ‘‘utility.’’ Utility functions are mathematical rep-
resentations of subjective value, based on observable choice
behavior (rather than unobservable satisfactions) [2]. In ex-
pected utility theory, the quantitative relationship between util-
ity and physical value,U(x), can be reconstructed from choices2Co-first author
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).under risk [3]. Such ‘‘von-Neumann and Morgenstern’’ (vNM)
utility functions are cardinal, in the strict sense that they are
defined up to a positive affine (shape-preserving) transforma-
tion [4], in contrast to ordinal utility relationships that are only
defined up to a monotonic (rank-preserving) transformation
[2]. Thus, the shapes of vNM utility functions are unique, and
this formalism permits meaningful approximation of marginal
utility—the additional utility gained by consuming additional
units of reward—as the first derivative, dU/dx [5]. Despite
considerable progress demonstrating that numerous brain
structures are involved in economic decision-making [6–17],
no animal neurophysiology study has investigated how neu-
rons encode the nonlinear relationship between utility and
physical value, as defined by expected utility theory. Most
importantly, measurement of neuronal reward responses
when utility functions are defined with regard to physical value
could provide biological insight regarding the relationship be-
tween the satisfaction experienced from reward and the utility
function defined from choices.
Midbrain dopamine neurons code reward prediction error, a
value interval important for learning [18–20]. Learning models
that faithfully reproduce the actions of dopamine neurons
tacitly assume the coding of objective value [18, 21]. However,
the dopamine signal shows hyperbolic temporal discounting
[10] and incorporates risk and different reward types onto a
common currency scale [17]. Prediction error and marginal
utility both represent a value interval, and both assume a refer-
ence state (prediction and current wealth or rational expecta-
tion [22, 23], respectively) and a gain or loss relative to that
state. Therefore, the dopamine prediction error signal could
be an ideal substrate for coding marginal utility.
Here, we sought to define utility as a function of physical
value using risky choices and investigate whether dopamine
reward responses reflected the marginal utility calculated
from the utility function. We used a classical method for
measuring vNM utility functions (the ‘‘fractile’’ procedure)
that iteratively aligns gamble outcomes with previously deter-
mined points on the utility axis [24, 25]. This procedure re-
sulted in closely spaced estimates of the physical reward
amounts mapped onto predefined utilities. The data were fit
with a continuous utility function, U(x) [24], and the marginal
utility was computed as the first derivative, dU/dx, of the fitted
function [5]. We then recorded dopamine responses to gam-
bles and outcomes and related them to the measured utility
function. The absence of common anchor points makes inter-
subjective utility comparisons generally implausible; there-
fore, we did not average behavioral and neuronal data across
the individual animals studied.
Results
Experimental Design and Behavior
Twomonkeysmade binary choices between gambles and safe
(riskless) reward (Figure 1A). The risky cue predicted a gamble
with two equiprobable, no-zero amounts of juice (each p = 0.5),
whereas the safe cuewas associatedwith a specific amount of
the same juice. The cues were bars whose vertical positions
indicated juice amount (see the Experimental Procedures).
Both animals received extensive training with >10,000 trials
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Figure 1. Behavioral Task and Utility Function
(A) Choice between safe reward and gamble. The
cues indicated safe or risky options with one or
two horizontal bars, respectively.
(B) Normalized lick duration was correlated posi-
tively with the expected value (EV) of the gamble.
Error bars indicate the SEM across behavioral
sessions.
(C) Probabilities of behavioral choices for domi-
nated (left) and dominating (right) safe options.
Error bars indicate the SEM from averages across
the four choice sets shown to the right.
(D) Average CEs of gambles with different EVs in
monkeys A and B. Left: risk seeking (CE > EV)
with low-value gambles (0.1 or 0.4 ml, red; p <
0.001 and p < 1026, in monkeys A and B, respec-
tively; t test). Right: risk avoidance (CE < EV) with
high-value gambles (0.9 or 1.2 ml, blue; p < 1027,
both animals). Error bars indicate the SEM across
PEST sessions.
(E and F) Behavioral utility function measured in
monkeys A and B (shown in E and F, respectively)
from CEs of binary, equiprobable gambles, using
the fractile method one to three times per day.
The curve indicates the average best-fit function
obtained from cubic splines across measurement
days, and the dashed lines insicate61 SD across
days (Experimental Procedures). The data points
represent the mean CEs for one example day of
testing (61 SD).
See also Figure S1.
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2492in each gamble. The animals’ lick durations correlated posi-
tively with the value of the gambles (Figure 1B). To ascertain
whether the animals fully understood the predicted gambles’
values and meaningfully maximized utility during choices un-
der risk, we tested first-order stochastic dominance in choices
between a safe reward and a gamble whose low or high
outcome equaled the safe reward (Figure S1A available online)
[2]. With all four gambles tested, both animals avoided the low
safe reward and preferred the high safe reward to the gamble
(Figure 1C). Indeed, the values of both the gamble and the safe
option significantly affected the animals’ choices on every trial
(p < 0.001 for both variables in both animals; logistic regres-
sion), and neither animal exhibited a significant side bias (p >
0.5, both animals; logistic regression). Thus, the animals
appropriately valued the cues, and their choices followed
first-order stochastic dominance.
Risk exerts an important influence on utility; it enhances util-
ity in risk seekers and reduces utility in risk avoiders. To assess
the animals’ risk attitudes, we measured the amount of safe
reward that led to choice indifference (‘‘certainty equivalent,’’
CE), for a low and high expected value (EV) gamble. We em-
ployed an adaptive psychometric procedure that used the an-
imal’s choice history to present safe options around the indif-
ference point (parameter estimation by sequential testing,
PEST; Figure S1B) [26]. The monkeys were risk seeking for a
gamble between small rewards (0.1 ml, p = 0.5 and 0.4 ml,
p = 0.5), indicated by CEs significantly larger than the EV (Fig-
ure 1D, left). However, monkeys were risk averse for a gamble
between larger rewards (0.9 ml, p = 0.5 and 1.2 ml, p = 0.5),where the measured CEs were signifi-
cantly smaller than the gamble EV (Fig-
ure 1D, right). To ensure that the animals
were maximizing value on every trial,
rather than exploiting the adaptivenature of the psychometric algorithm, we verified these results
using an incentive-compatible choice procedure in which the
current choice options were selected independently of the an-
imals’ previous choices (see the Experimental Procedures).
Again, both animals were risk seeking for the small EV gamble
but risk averse for the large one (Figure S1C). Thus, the mon-
keys exhibited risk seeking and risk avoidance depending on
reward size, demonstrating a magnitude effect similar to that
of human decision makers [27, 28].
To obtain utility functions across a broad range of experi-
mentally reasonable, nonzero juice amounts (0.1–1.2 ml), we
used the ‘‘fractile’’ method that iteratively aligns the gamble
outcomes to previously determined CEs (Figures S1D and
S1E and Experimental Procedures) [24, 25]. For instance, on
one particular day, the measured CE for the gamble (0.1 ml,
p = 0.5 and 1.2 ml, p = 0.5) was 0.76 ml (Figure S1D, step 1).
We used this CE as an outcome to construct two new gambles
(0.1 ml, p = 0.5 and 0.76 ml, p = 0.5; 0.76 ml, p = 0.5 and 1.2 ml,
p = 0.5).We thenmeasured the CEs for these two new gambles
(Figure S1D, steps 2 and 3) and used those measurements to
further bisect intervals on the utility axis. This iterative proce-
dure resulted in progressively finer grained gambles, leading
to closely spaced CEs for the entire range of 0.1–1.2 ml that
mapped onto a numeric utility axis with an arbitrarily chosen
origin and range of 0 and 1 util, respectively (Figure S1E).
The close spacing of the CEs permitted an estimation of a
continuous utility function [24]. To estimate an underlying
function without prior assumptions regarding its form, we fit
piecewise polynomial functions to the measured CEs (cubic
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Figure 2. Utility Functions Predicted Risky Choice Behavior
(A and B) Out-of-sample predictions for 12 new gambles (Table S1) not used
for constructing the utility functions for monkeys A and B (shown in A and B,
respectively). All expected utilities were derived from functions in Figures 1E
and 1F (monkeys A and B, respectively). The black line represents the fit of a
Deming regression.
(C andD) Same data as in (A) and (B), but with the EVs removed from the pre-
dicted and measured values. The solid line represents the fit of a Deming
regression, and dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval from
the regression.
See also Table S1.
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2493splines with three knots). In both animals, the functions were
convex at low juice amounts (indicating risk seeking) and
became linear (risk neutral) and then concave (risk avoiding)
as juice amounts increased (Figures 1E and 1F).Where the util-
ity function was convex (Figures 1E and 1F), the animals
consistently selected more risky options (Figure 1D, left), and
where the utility function was concave (Figures 1E and 1F),
the animals consistently selected the less risky options (Fig-
ure 1D, right). Thus, the risk attitudes inferred from the curva-
tures of the utility functions confirmed and substantiated the
risk attitudes nonparametrically derived from comparison of
CEs with EVs. Moreover, the animals’ choices depended
neither on the previous outcome (p > 0.5, both animals; logistic
regression), nor on accumulated reward over a testing day (p =
0.7 and p = 0.09 for monkeys A and B, respectively; logistic
regression). Taken together, these results demonstrated a
specific nonlinear subjective weighting of physical reward
size that was relatively stable throughout testing.
To empirically test the particular shape of the constructed
utility functions, we investigated how well it predicted the
CEs of gambles not used for its construction [24, 29]. We
used the measured utility function to calculate the expected
utilities (EUs) for 12 new binary, equiprobable gambles with
outcomes between 0.1 and 1.2 ml (Table S1) and behaviorally
measured the CEs of the new gambles. The calculated EUs
predicted well the utilities of the measured CEs (Figures 2A
and 2B for monkeys A and B, respectively; Deming regres-
sion), suggesting that the utility functions were valid within
the range of tested reward, yet this relationship could have
been driven by the EV. To better distinguish the predictive po-
wer of the nonlinearity in the utility function, we removed the
linear EV component from the observed and predicted values.
The regressions on the residuals demonstrated a powerful
contribution of the curvature of the measured utility functions
to explaining choice behavior (Figures 2C and 2D for monkeys
A and B, respectively; Deming regression). Thus, the nonlinear
shape of the constructed utility function explained choices
better than linear physical value. These results provided
empirical evidence for the specific shape of the function and
suggested that the measured utility functions were unique
up to a shape-preserving (i.e., positive affine) transformation.
The quasicontinuous nature of the utility function was
confirmed in gambles varying reward probability in small steps
(Figures S1F and S1G and Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). Importantly, this separately measured utility function
on the restricted reward range (0.0 to 0.5 ml) did not reflect
the same overall shape as the functions measured between
0.1 and 1.2 ml (first convex, then linear, then concave). Rather,
the restricted utility function only reflected the convex initial
segment of the utility function measured from 0.1 to 1.2 ml.
This result suggested that the shape of the overall utility func-
tions (Figures 1E and 1F) did not result from value normaliza-
tion around themean. Taken together, these results document
that numerically meaningful, quasicontinuous utility functions
can be derived in monkeys. Therefore, we used the first deriv-
ative of this continuous function to estimate marginal utility.
Dopamine Responses to Gamble Outcomes
We investigated the coding of marginal utility by dopa-
mine responses to reward prediction errors, defined as
reward 2 prediction. Although we (necessarily) used a choice
task to measure utility functions, we examined dopamine
reward responses in a nonchoice task. The subtrahend in the
previous equation (prediction) is not uniquely defined in achoice context; the prediction can be based on some combina-
tionofoffervalues [21]. Therefore,we recorded theelectrophys-
iological responses of 83 typical midbrain dopamine neurons
(FigureS2, Experimental Procedures, andSupplemental Exper-
imental Procedures) after extensive training in a nonchoice task
(Figure S3A; >10,000 trials/gamble). The animal fixated on a
central spot and then was shown one of three specific bar
cues predicting a binary, equiprobable gamble between speci-
fied juice rewards (0.1ml,p=0.5and0.4ml,p=0.5 in red; 0.5ml,
p = 0.5 and 0.8ml, p = 0.5 in black; 0.9ml, p = 0.5 and 1.2ml, p =
0.5 in blue; Figure 3A, top). The corresponding EVs were small,
medium, or large (0.25, 0.65, or 1.05ml, respectively; Figure 3A,
top). The stable dopamine responses to the fixation spot
reflected the constant overall mean reward value (0.65 ml)
predictedby that stimulus (FiguresS3C–S3E). Thephysical pre-
diction error at each cuewasdefined by the difference between
the EV of each gamble and a constant, mean prediction of
0.65ml set by the fixation spot.Dopamine responses to thepre-
dictive cues showed a significant, positive relationship to pre-
diction error in single neurons (Figure 3A, middle; p < 0.001,
rho = 0.68; Pearson’s correlation) and the entire recorded pop-
ulations (Figure 3A, bottom; n = 52monkeyA; p < 0.0001 in both
animals; rho = 0.57 and rho = 0.75 in monkeys A and B, respec-
tively; Pearson’s correlation; see Figure S3B formonkeyB pop-
ulation data, n = 31), suggesting that the substantial experience
of the animals had induced appropriate neuronal processing of
the relative cue values.
To identify the nature of the relationship between dopamine
neurons and utility, we inspected their responses to the pre-
diction errors generated by the individual outcomes of the
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Figure 3. Dopamine Prediction Error Responses Reflect Marginal Utility of Reward
(A) Top: three cues, each predicting a binary gamble involving two juice amounts. Middle: single-neuron example of dopamine response to cues shown
above (p < 0.001, rho = 0.41; Pearson’s correlation). Bottom: population dopamine response of all recorded neurons (n = 52) in monkey A to cues shown
above (p < 0.0001, rho = 0.44; Pearson’s correlation; see Figure S3B for population response in monkey B). The fixation spot that started the trial predicted
value equal to the mean value of the three pseudorandomly alternating gambles. Thus, the depression with the low-value gamble reflects the negative pre-
diction error (left), and the activation with the high-value gamble reflects the positive prediction error (right). Despite the short latency activation in the pop-
ulation response to the small gamble, the average response over the whole analysis window (indicated in green) was significantly depressed.
(B) Marginal utility as first derivative of nonlinear utility function. The continuous marginal utility function (dU/dx; solid black line, bottom) is approximated
from utility function (top). Red, black, and blue bars (bottom) represent discrete marginal utilities in three 0.15 ml intervals corresponding to positive pre-
diction errors in gambles shown in at the top of (A).
(C) Top: single-neuron PSTHs and rastergrams of positive prediction error responses to the larger reward from the three gambles shown in (A) (0.4, 0.8, and
1.2 ml). Positive prediction errors (0.15 ml) are shown in red, black, and blue above the PSTHs. Data are aligned to prediction errors generated by liquid flow
extending beyond offset of smaller reward in each gamble (see Figure S3G). Bottom: population PSTH across all recorded neurons (n = 52) frommonkey A to
the larger reward from the three gambles shown in (A) (0.4, 0.8, and 1.2 ml). Data are aligned to prediction errors generated by liquid flow extending beyond
offset of smaller reward in each gamble (see Figure S3G).
(D) Correspondence betweenmarginal utility (top) and neuronal prediction error responses (bottom) in the three gambles tested. Top:marginal utilities asso-
ciated with receiving larger outcome of each gamble were averaged from 14 and 15 sessions, in monkeys A and B, respectively (approximated by the aver-
aged slope of utility function between predicted and received reward). Asterisks indicate significant differences (p < 0.00001, post hoc Tukey-Kramer after
p < 0.0001 Kruskal-Wallis test, both animals). Error bars indicate the SDs across testing sessions. Bottom: average population responses in green analysis
window shown in (C). Asterisks indicate significant differences (p < 0.01, post hoc t test with Bonferroni correction after p < 0.00002 and p < 0.008, one-way
ANOVA in monkeys A and B, respectively; p < 0.05 in 27 of 83 single neurons, t test). Error bars indicate the SEMs across neurons.
(E) Population PSTHs of negative prediction error responses to the smaller reward from the three gambles shown in (A) (0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 ml) in
monkeys A (top) and B (bottom). ns, not significantly different from one another. Data are aligned to prediction errors generated by liquid flow stopping
(dashed lines).
Light-green shaded boxes indicate the analysis windows in (A), (C), and (E). See also Figures S2 and S3.
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2494gambles delivered 1.5 s after the respective cues. The predic-
tion errors had identical magnitudes in all three gambles
(60.15 ml), but each gamble was aligned to a different position
of the previously assessed nonlinear utility functions (Fig-
ure 3B, top). The first derivative of the nonlinear utility function
(marginal utility) was significantly larger around the medium
gamble compared with the two other gambles (Figure 3B, bot-
tom). Strikingly, the dopamine responses to 0.8 ml of juice in
the medium gamble dwarfed the prediction error responses
after 0.4 or 1.2 ml in their respective gambles (effect sizes
compared to baseline neuronal activity = 1.4 versus 0.7 and
0.6, respectively; p < 0.005; Hedge’s g). The neuronal re-
sponses thus followed the inverted U of marginal utility and re-
flected the slope of the utility function in single neurons (Fig-
ure 3C, middle; p < 0.05, rho = 0.41; Pearson’s correlation)
and the entire populations in monkeys A (Figures 3C and 3D,
bottom; n = 52) and B (Figure 3D, bottom; n = 31) (p < 1029,
rho = 0.44; Pearson’s correlation, both animals). In the linear
part of the utility function, where the slopes were steeper
and marginal utilities significantly higher (Figure 3D, top; p <
0.00001 post hoc Tukey-Kramer after p < 0.0001 Kruskal-Wallis test, both animals), the dopamine responses were
significantly stronger, but in the convex and concave parts of
the utility functions, where the slopes were shallower andmar-
ginal utilities smaller, the responses were also smaller (Fig-
ure 3D, bottom; p < 0.01, post hoc t test with Bonferroni
correction after p < 0.00002 and p < 0.008, one-way ANOVA
in monkeys A and B, respectively; p < 0.05 in 27 of 83 single
neurons, two-sided t test between responses to large [black]
and small [red and blue] marginal utilities). Although negative
prediction error responses were significantly correlated with
marginal disutility in 14 individual neurons (p < 0.05; Pearson’s
correlation), this relationship failed to reach significance in the
population of 52 and 31 neurons of monkeys A and B, respec-
tively (Figure 3E; p > 0.4 and p > 0.2; Pearson’s correlation),
perhaps because of the naturally low baseline impulse rate
and accompanying small dynamic range. When we analyzed
positive and negative prediction error responses together,
there was a strong correlation with marginal utility (44 single
neurons, p < 0.05; population, p < 1027 and p < 10215, rho =
0.3 and rho =0.5, in monkeys A and B, respectively; Pearson’s
correlation). However, this combined analysis didn’t account
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Figure 4. Responses to Unpredicted Reward
Reflect Marginal Utility
(A) Population histogram of dopamine neurons
from monkey A (n = 16). The early component
was statistically indistinguishable, but the late
component (indicated by the pink horizontal bar)
was reward magnitude dependent. For display
purposes, the neuronal responses to five reward
sizes (rather than 12) are shown.
(B and C) Average population dopamine re-
sponses to different juice amounts, measured in
the time window shown in (A) (pink bar) and
normalized to 0 and 1, for monkeys A and B (shown in B and C, respectively). In each graph, the red line (which corresponds to the secondary y axis) shows
the utility gained from each specific reward over zero (marginal utility) and is identical to the utility function measured separately in each animal (Figures 1E
and 1F). The utility function for monkey B was truncated at the largest reward delivered (to monkey B) in the unpredicted reward task (1.0 ml). n, number of
neurons.
Error bars indicate the SEMs across neurons. See also Figure S2.
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2495for the (approximately 5-fold) asymmetric dynamic range of
dopamine neurons in the positive and negative domains and
therefore should be taken with caution.
To confirm that the particular nature of the temporal predic-
tion errors in the experiment did not explain the observed
neuronal utility coding, we used temporal difference (TD)
models and ruled out other possibilities, such as differential
liquid valve opening durations (Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and Figures S3F–S3J). Importantly, we are aware
of no simple subjective value measure for reward size that
could explain the nonlinear dopamine responses to receiving
an extra 0.15 ml. Rather, the prediction on the utility scale
and the corresponding slope of the utility function was neces-
sary to explain the observed responses. Thus, these data
strongly suggest that the dopamine prediction error response
coded the marginal utility of reward.
Dopamine Responses to Unpredicted Reward
To obtain amore fine-grained neuronal function for comparison
withmarginal utility,weused12distinct rewardvolumesdistrib-
uted across the reward range of the measured utility functions
(0.1–1.2ml inmonkeyA,butmonkeyBwasonly testedbetween
0.1 and 1 ml). Because these rewards were delivered without
any temporal structure, explicit cue, or specific behavioral con-
tingencies, the animals could not predict when in time the
reward would be delivered, and thus the moment-by-moment
reward prediction was constant and very close to zero. There-
fore, in contrast to the gambles with their different predicted
values (Figure3), themarginal utility of eachunpredicted reward
was defined as the interval between the utility of each reward
and the constant utility of the moment-by-moment prediction
of zero. In this context the marginal utility followed by definition
the utility function. We recorded 37 additional neurons (n = 16
and n = 21 in monkeys A and B, respectively) while the animals
received one of the 12 possible reward sizes at unpredictable
moments in time. The late, differential response component
reflected closely the nonlinear increase in marginal utility as
reward amounts increased (Figure 4; p < 1024, both animals;
rho = 0.94 and rho = 0.97; Pearson’s correlation). Despite
some apparent deviations, the difference between the neuronal
responses and the utility functions were not significantly
different from zero (p > 0.1 and p > 0.2, in monkeys A and B,
respectively; t test). Thus, the dopamine responses to unpre-
dicted reward reflected marginal utility.
Neuronal Teaching Signal for Utility
Dopamine prediction error responses are compatible with
teaching signals defined by TD reinforcement models [18,21]. TD models learn a value prediction from outcomes; we
therefore tested whether the value prediction a TD model
learned from an animal’s dopamine responses would reflect
the expected utility defined by the animal’s choice behavior.
To do so, we constructed two gambles (0.5 ml, p = 0.5 and
0.8 ml, p = 0.5; 0.1 ml, p = 0.5 and 1.2 ml, p = 0.5) with identical
EV but different expected utilities (Figure 5A) and took the
dopamine responses to those four outcomes (Figure 4B) as
the inputs to our models. We trained two models to predict
the value of the two gambles, separately. The first model
was trained with the population dopamine responses to either
0.5 or 0.8 ml of reward, delivered in pseudorandom alternation
with equal probability of p = 0.5 (Figure 5B). The secondmodel
was trained with the dopamine responses to 0.1 or 1.2ml (both
p = 0.5). Each learning simulation was run for 1,000 trials, and
each simulation was repeated 2,000 times to account for the
pseudorandom outcome schedule. The TD model trained on
the dopamine responses to 0.1 or 1.2 ml acquired a learned
value prediction that was significantly larger than the learned
value prediction of the TD model trained on responses to 0.5
or 0.8ml (Figure 5C). Thus, the differential TDmodel responses
to the cues correctly reflected the expected utility of the gam-
bles and thus the risk attitudes of the animals. Similarly, TD
models trained on dopamine responses from monkey B (Fig-
ure 4C) also learned an expected-utility-like prediction when
the same procedure was repeated with different gambles
(0.35 ml, p = 0.5 and 0.75 ml, p = 0.5; 0.1 ml, p = 0.5 and
1.0 ml, p = 0.5) (Figures S4A and S4B). Although these data
cannot show that dopamine neurons provide the original
source for utility functions in the brain, these modeling results
demonstrate that dopamine responses could serve as an
effective teaching signals for establishing utility predictions
of risky gambles and training economic preferences.
Neuronal Cue Responses Reflect Expected Utility
To examine whether risk was incorporated into the neuronal
signals in a meaningful fashion consistent with expected utility
theory and predicted by the modeling results, we examined
dopamine responses to the same two gambles employed for
the reinforcement model. The riskier gamble was a mean pre-
serving spread of the less risky gamble, thus removing any ef-
fects of returns [30]. As calculated from the extensively tested
utility function, the riskier gamble had a higher expected utility
(Figure 5A) and second-order stochastically dominated the
less risky gamble in risk seekers [31]. Accordingly, both mon-
keys reported a higher CE for the riskier gamble compared to
the less risky one (measured in choices; Figure 5D), and dopa-
mine responses to the cues were significantly stronger for the
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Figure 5. Modeled and Recorded Expected Util-
ity Responses
(A) Gambles for reinforcement modeling. Two
gambles (0.1ml, p = 0.5 and 1.2ml, p = 0.5 [green];
0.5 ml, p = 0.5 and 0.8 ml, p = 0.5 [black]) had
equal expected value (EV = 0.65 ml) but different
risks. The gambles were aligned onto the previ-
ously established utility function (Figure 1F) and
yielded higher (green) and lower (black) expected
utility (EU; horizontal dashed lines).
(B) A TD model learned to predict gamble utility
from dopamine responses. The surface plot repre-
sents the prediction error term from a TD model
(eligibility trace parameter l = 0.9) trained on the
neuronal responses to 0.5 or 0.8 ml of juice. The
normalizedpopulation responses (fromthewindow
defined by the pink bar; Figure 4A) were delivered
as outcomes (Rew), and trained a cue response
(Cue). The ‘‘cue’’ response fluctuated due to the
pseudorandom outcome delivery. ‘‘Stable predic-
tion’’ indicates the phase after initial learning
when the responses fluctuated about a stable
mean, and the average of this value was used in
(C) (where it was defined as the last 200 of 1,000 tri-
als; here we show 150 trials for display purposes).
(C) Histograms of learned TD prediction errors reflect the expected utility of gambles when trained on neuronal responses. Each histogram is comprised of
2,000 data points that represent the predicted gamble value (high expected utility gamble in green versus low expected utility gamble in black, defined in A)
after training (shown in B) with the neuronal responses from monkey A (Figure 4A) to the respective gamble outcomes (*p < 102254; t test.)
(D) Behaviorally defined certainty equivalents reflect the expected utilities predicted in (A). Higher CE for riskier gamble suggests compliance with second-
order stochastic dominance. Error bars indicate the SEMs across CE measurements.
(E andF) Stronger dopamine responses to higher expectedutility gamble (green) compared to lower expectedutility gamble (black) inmonkeysA (shown inE;
p < 0.004, t test) and B (shown in F; p < 0.02, t test), consistent with second-order stochastic dominance. The pink bar shows the analysis time window. n,
number of neurons.
See also Figures S2 and S4.
Current Biology Vol 24 No 21
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green versus black). Thus, both the behavior and the neuronal
responses were compatible with second-order stochastic
dominance, suggesting meaningful incorporation of risk into
utility at both the behavioral and neuronal level. Consistent
with the modeled cue responses (Figure 5), the dopamine re-
sponses appeared to reflect the expected utilities derived
from the measured utility function, rather than the probability
or the EV of the gambles. Importantly, the dopamine utility re-
sponses to the cue did not code risk independently of value;
the responses were similar between a gamble with consider-
able risk and a safe reward when the two had similar utility
(Figure S4C). Thus, the observed behavioral and neuronal
responses demonstrated that the dopamine neurons mean-
ingfully incorporated risk into utility and suggested that
dopamine neurons support the economic behavior of the
animals.
Dopamine Responses Comply with First-Order Stochastic
Dominance
As the animals’ choices complied with first-order stochastic
dominance (Figures 1C and S1A), we examined whether dopa-
mine cue responses were consistent with this behavior. We
examined responses to binary, equiprobable gambles with
identical upper outcomes but different lower outcomes (Fig-
ure 6A). With any strictly positive monotonic value function,
including our established utility functions (Figures 1E and
1F), the lower outcomes, in the face of identical upper out-
comes, determine the preference ordering between the two
gambles [2]. Bothmonkeys valued the cues appropriately (Fig-
ure 6A, right). Accordingly, dopamine responses to cues were
significantly larger for the more valuable gamble and didn’t
simply code upper bar height (Figure 6B). Thus, as with theanimals’ choices, the dopamine neurons followed first-order
stochastic dominance, suggesting appropriate neuronal pro-
cessing of economic values.
Discussion
These data demonstrate that dopamine prediction error re-
sponses represent a neuronal correlate for the fundamental
behavioral variable of marginal utility. The crucial manipulation
used here was the measurement of quantitative utility func-
tions from choices under risk, using well-established proce-
dures. Themeasured functions provided a nonlinear numerical
function between physical reward amounts and utility whose
shape was meaningful. This function permitted meaningful
computation of marginal utility as the first derivative. The
dopamine prediction error responses to gamble outcomes
and to unpredicted reward reflected the marginal utility of
reward. The modeling data suggested that the dopamine mar-
ginal utility signal could train appropriate neuronal correlates
of utility for economic decisions under risk. As prediction error
and marginal utility arise from different worlds of behavioral
analysis, a dopamine prediction error signal coding marginal
utility could provide a biological link between animal learning
theory and economic decision theory.
Although previous studies have shown that dopamine cue
and reward responses encode a subjective value prediction
error [10, 17], perhaps themost interesting aspect of this study
is that responses to the reward itself (rather than the cue re-
sponses) reflected specifically the first derivative of the
measured utility function. There is no a priori reason that
they should do so. Economic utility is measured by observed
choices, and economic theory is generally agnostic about
what happens afterward. For example, risk aversion is
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Dopamine responses comply with first-order stochastic dominance.
(A) Two binary, equiprobable gambles (left) had identical upper outcomes;
they varied in lower outcomes which defined the value difference between
the gambles and thus the first-order stochastic dominance. Measured
CEs were larger for the gamble with larger EV (p < 0.02, right, both animals,
t test). Error bars indicate the SEMs across CE measurements.
(B) Neuronal population responses were larger to the stochastically domi-
nant gamble (blue versus green) (p < 0.01, both animals, t test). These
response differences suggest coding of expected utility rather than upper
bar height or value of better outcome (which were both constant between
the two gambles). Pink horizontal bars show neuronal analysis timewindow.
n, number of neurons.
See also Figure S2.
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2497commonly attributed to diminishing marginal utility,
yet because economists observe choice rather than marginal
utility, the explanation of diminishing marginal utility is an
‘‘as if’’ concept. In this study, the dopamine reward responses
were directly related to the shape of the utility function defined
from risky choices. The difference between the dopamine
response magnitudes from one reward to the next larger
reward decreased in the risk-avoiding range and increased
in the risk-seeking range (Figures 3C, 3D, 4B, and 4C). Thus,
the nonlinear neuronal response function to reward provides
direct evidence for a biological correlate for marginal utility.
The behavioral compliance with first- and second-order
stochastic dominance provided strong evidence that both
animals made meaningful economic choices. First-order sto-
chastic dominance dictates what option should be chosen
based on the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the
offer values [2, 32]. One choice option first-order stochastically
dominates a second optionwhen there is nothing to lose by se-
lecting the former (the CDF of the dominating option is always
lower to the right; Figure S1A). Therefore, individuals whomeet
the most basic criteria of valuing larger rewards over smaller
rewards should chose thedominating option, just like ourmon-
keys did (Figure 1C). Second-order stochastic dominance dic-
tates the utility ranking of options with equal expected returns
but different risk [30]. For risk avoiders (concave utility func-
tion), a less risky gamble second-order stochastically domi-
nates a more risky gamble with the same expected return.
For risk seekers (convex utility function), the opposite is true
[31]. Because second-order stochastic dominance uses utility
functions to dictatewhat gamble should be chosen, adherence
to second-order stochastic dominance could be used as a
measure of choice consistency. Both of our monkeys were
overall risk seekers (indicated by the inflection point of the
utility function offset to the right; Figures 1E and 1F), and
they both reported a higher CE for gambles with larger risk
compared to a gamble with smaller risk but the same expected
return (Figure 5D). Together, these two measures indicated
that both animals combined objective value with risk in a
meaningful way and maximized expected utility.
The ability of the recovered utility functions to predict risky
choice behavior provided additional strong evidence that theanimals were approximating the behavior of expected utility
maximizers. Although traditional expected utility maximizers
follow a set of axioms establishing basic rationality [3], it
is not always practical or feasible to measure how close actual
behavior matches the axioms [29]. Therefore, an accepted test
for the shape ofmeasured utility functions is to investigate how
well they can predict risky choices [24, 29]. The utility function
measured in both animals predicted well the values they
assigned to gambles not used for constructing the function
(Figures 2C and 2D). Moreover, the utility functions adhered
to basic assumptions about how utility functions should
behave; specifically, they were positive monotonic, nonsatu-
rating within our reward range and quasicontinuous due to
the fine-grained fractile CE assessment. Taken together, these
observations suggest that the monkeys made meaningful,
value-based choices and that the measured utility functions
reflected the underlying preferences.
The convex-concave curvature of the measured utility func-
tion differed from the usually assumed concave form but is
nevertheless well known in both economic utility theory [27,
28, 33] and animal learning theory [24]. Risk-seeking behavior
for small reward has often been observed in monkeys [15, 17,
34–36], and the increasing risk aversionwith increasing reward
size nicely mirrored risk sensitivities in humans [37]. By
following a proven procedure for recovering vNM utility [24,
25], and because the resulting functions were able to predict
preferences for risky gambles [29], our measured utility func-
tions retained important features of cardinal utility. Although
the origin and scale of our utility functions were arbitrary, the
shape of utility functions measured under risk is unique
(defined up to a positive affine transformation) [3, 4]. Utility
function with these properties thus allowed estimation of mar-
ginal utility and statistically meaningful correlations with natu-
rally quantitative neuronal responses.
Although expected utility theory is the dominant normative
theory of economic decision-making, it fails to provide an
adequate description of actual choice behavior [38–40]. The
Allais paradox in particular demonstrates that human decision
makers do not treat probability in a linear fashion [38]. They
normally overvalue small probabilities and undervalue large
ones [40, 41]. In this study, we selected one probability, p =
0.5, where distortion is minimal [41]. Moreover, because the
probability was constant, any probability distortion was also
constant and could not influence the curvature of our
measured function.
The coding of marginal utility by prediction error responses
suggests a common neuronal implementation of these two
different terms, which would suit the dual function of phasic
dopamine signals. The dopamine prediction error response
is a well-known teaching signal [18, 42], yet recent research
suggested that dopamine may also influence choice on a
trial-by-trial basis [43]. Coding the marginal utility associated
with prediction errors would suit both functions well. Decision
makers maximize utility rather than objective value; therefore,
neurons participating in decision-making should be coding
utility rather than objective value. Indeed, many reward neu-
rons in dopamine projection areas track subjective value [7,
11, 15, 16, 44]. The modeling results demonstrated that these
dopamine responses would be suitable to update economic
value coding in these neurons. Although some values may
be computed online rather than learned though trial and error
[45], having a teaching signal encoding marginal utility re-
moves the time-consuming transformation from objective
value and thus is evolutionary adaptive.
Current Biology Vol 24 No 21
2498Despite the unambiguously significant marginal utility re-
sponses in the positive domain, the negative prediction error
responses failed to significantly code marginal disutility. This
negative result could stem from the simple fact that the dy-
namic range in the positive domain is approximately 5-fold
greater than the dynamic range in the negative domain. Alter-
natively, it is possible that the measured utility functions did
not correctly capture marginal disutility. Modern decision the-
ories posit that the natural reference point with which to mea-
sure gains and losses is predicted wealth [22, 23]. Under this
theoretical framework, the received rewards that were smaller
than predicted would be considered losses. Utility functions
spanning the gain and loss domain are ‘‘kinked’’ at the refer-
ence point [40], therefore the marginal disutility would not be
the mirror image of the marginal utility. Future studies will
investigate this intriguing possibility.
Distinct from the observed adaptation to reward range [46],
the current dopamine responses failed to adapt to the different
gambles, possibly because of the larger tested reward range
and more demanding reward variation. Also distinct from pre-
viously observed objective risk coding in dopamine neurons
[47], orbitofrontal cortex [35, 48], and anterior dorsal septum
[49], the current data, consistent with our previous observa-
tions [17], demonstrate the incorporation of risk into value cod-
ing in a manner consistent with traditional theories of utility.
Risk affects value processing in human prefrontal cortex in a
manner compatible with risk attitude [50]. The current data
provide a neuronal substrate for this effect by linking it to a
specific neuronal type and mechanism.
Experimental Procedures
Animals and General Behavior
Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; 13.4 and 13.1 kg) were used
for all studies. All experimental protocols and procedures were approved
by the Home Office of the United Kingdom. A titanium head holder (Gray
Matter Research) and stainless steel recording chamber (Crist Instruments
and custom made) were aseptically implanted under general anesthesia
before the experiment. The recording chamber for vertical electrode entry
was centered 8 mm anterior to the interaural line. During experiments, an-
imals sat in a primate chair (Crist Instruments) positioned 30 cm from a
computer monitor. During behavioral training, testing and neuronal
recording, eye position was monitored noninvasively using infrared eye
tracking (ETL200; ISCAN). Licking was monitored with an infrared opto-
sensor positioned in front of the juice spout (V6AP; STM Sensors). Eye,
lick, and digital task event signals were sampled at 2 kHz and stored at
200 Hz (eye) or 1 kHz. Custom-made software (MATLAB, Mathworks)
running on a Microsoft Windows XP computer controlled the behavioral
tasks.
Behavioral Task and Analysis
The animals associated visual cues with reward of different amounts and
risk levels. We employed a task involving choice between safe (riskless)
and risky reward for behavioral measurements and a nonchoice task for
the neuronal recordings. The cues contained horizontal bars whose vertical
positions indicated the reward amount (between 0.1 and 1.2 ml in both an-
imals). A cuewith a single bar indicated a safe reward, and a cuewith double
bars signaled an equiprobable gamble between two outcomes indicated by
their respective bar positions.
Each trial began with a fixation spot at the center of the monitor. The an-
imal directed its gaze to it and held it there for 0.5 s. Then the fixation spot
disappeared. In the choice task (Figure 1A), one specific gamble cue and a
safe cue appeared to the left and right of the fixation spot, pseudorandomly
varying between the two positions. The animal had 1 s to indicate its choice
by shifting its gaze to the center of the chosen cue and holding it there for
another 0.5 s. Then the unchosen cue disappeared while the chosen cue re-
mained on the screen for an additional 1 s. The chosen rewardwas delivered
at offset of the chosen cue by means of a computer controlled solenoid
liquid valve (0.004 ml/ms opening time).We performed a binomial logistic regression to assess the effect on
choice (for gamble or safe option) of the following factors: gamble value,
safe value, accumulated daily reward, prior outcome (better or worse than
predicted for the gamble and as predicted for the safe option), and position
on the screen.
Estimation of CEs using PEST
To measure CEs and to construct utility curves, we used PEST. We as-
sessed the amount of blackcurrant juice that was subjectively equivalent
to the value associated with each gamble (Figure 1D). The rules governing
the PEST procedure were adapted from Luce [26]. Each PEST sequence
consisted of several consecutive trials during which one constant gamble
was presented as a choice option against the safe reward. On the initial
trial of a PEST sequence, the amount of safe reward was chosen randomly
from the interval 0.1 to 1.2 ml. Based on the animal’s choice between the
safe reward and gamble, the safe amount was adjusted on the subse-
quent trial. If the animal chose the gamble on trial t, then the safe amount
was increased by ε on trial t + 1. However, if the animal chose the safe
reward on trial t, the safe amount was reduced by ε on trial t + 1. Initially,
ε was large. After the third trial of a PEST sequence, ε was adjusted ac-
cording to the doubling rule and the halving rule. Specifically, every time
two consecutive choices were the same, the size of ε was doubled, and
every time the animal switched from one option to the other, the size of
ε was halved. Thus, the procedure converged by locating subsequent
safe offers on either side of the true indifference value and reducing ε until
the interval containing the indifference value was small. The size of this in-
terval is a parameter set by the experimenter, called the exit rule. For our
study, the exit rule was 20 ml. When ε fell below the exit rule, the PEST pro-
cedure terminated, and the indifference value was calculated by taking the
mean of the final two safe rewards. A typical PEST session lasted 15–20
trials.
Incentive Compatible Psychometric Measurement of CEs
To confirm the CEs measured using PEST method, we used a choice task
wherein the choice options did not depend on animal’s previous choice
(i.e., incentive compatible). We assessed CEs psychometrically from
choices between a safe reward and a binary, equiprobable gamble (p =
0.5, each option), using simultaneously presented bar cues for safe reward
and gamble. We varied pseudorandomly the safe reward across the whole
range of values (flat probability distribution), thus setting the tested values
irrespectively of the animal’s previous choices.We thus estimated the prob-
ability with which monkeys were choosing the safe reward over the gamble
for a wide range of reward magnitudes. We fitted the logistic function of the
following form on these choice data:
PðSafeChoiceÞ=11+ e2 ða+ bðSafeRewardðmlÞÞÞ;
where a is a measure of choice bias and b reflects sensitivity (slope). The CE
of each gamble was then estimated from the psychometric curve by deter-
mining the point on the x axis which corresponded to 50% choice (indiffer-
ence) in the y axis. As Figure S1C illustrates, for the gamble with lowEV (red),
the estimated CE was larger than the gamble’s EV, indicating risk seeking.
By contrast, for the gamble with high EV (blue), the estimated CE was
smaller than the gamble’s EV, indicating risk aversion.
Constructing Utility Functions with the Fractile Method
We determined each monkey’s utility function in the range between 0.1 and
1.2 ml using the fractile method on binary, equiprobable gambles (each p =
0.5; one example fractile procedure is shown in Figure S1C) [24, 25]. To do
so, we first measured the CE of an equiprobable gamble (p = 0.5, each
outcome) between 0.1 and 1.2 ml using PEST. The measured CE in the
example of Figure S1D was 0.76 ml. Setting of u(0.1 ml) = 0 util and
u(1.2 ml) = 1 util results in u(0.76 ml) = 0.5 util. We the used this CE as an
outcome to construct two new gambles (0.1 ml, p = 0.5 and 0.76 ml, p =
0.5; 0.76ml, p = 0.5 and 1.2ml, p = 0.5) thenmeasured their CEs (Figure S1D,
steps 2 and 3), which corresponded to u = 0.25 and 0. 75 util, respectively
(Figure S1D, steps 2 and 3). We iterated this procedure, using previously es-
tablished CE as the outcomes in new gambles, until we had between seven
and nine CEs corresponding to utilities of 0, 0.063, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
0.875, 0.938, and 1.0 util (in the example session shown in Figure S1E, seven
points were measured, and the two corresponding to 0.063 and 0.938 were
omitted). We fit cubic splines to these data (see below for details) and pro-
vided an estimation of the shape of the monkey’s utility function in the range
of 0.1 and 1.2 ml for that session of testing.
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days of testing (14 and 15 times for monkeys A and B, respectively). For
each fractile procedure, we measured each gamble multiple times and
used the average CE as the outcome for the next gamble. We then fit the
data acquired in each fractile procedure using local data interpolation
(i.e., splines, MATLAB SLM tool). We used such fitting in order to avoid
any assumption about the form of the fitted function. This procedure fits cu-
bic functions on consecutive segments of the data and uses the least square
method to minimize the difference between empirical data and the fitted
curve. The number of polynomial pieces was controlled by the number of
knots which the algorithm was allowed to freely place on the x axis. We
used three knots for our fittings. We restricted the fitting to have a positive
slope over the whole range of the outcomes, andwe required the function to
be weakly increasing based on the fundamental economic assumption that
more of a good does not decrease total utility, i.e., the function was nonsa-
tiating in the range used. The fits were averaged together to give the final
function (Figures 1E and 1F).Neuronal Data Acquisition and Analysis
Dopamine neuronswere functionally localizedwith respect to (1) the trigem-
inal somatosensory thalamus explored in awake animals and under general
anesthesia (very small perioral and intraoral receptive fields, high proportion
of tonic responses, 2–3 mm dorsoventral extent), (2) tonically position cod-
ing ocular motor neurons, and (3) phasically direction coding ocular premo-
tor neurons in awake animals (Figure S2). Individual dopamine neurons were
identified using established criteria of long waveform (>2.5 ms) and low
baseline firing (fewer than eight impulses per second). We recorded extra-
cellular activity from 120 dopamine neurons (68 and 52 in monkeys A and
B, respectively) during the reward prediction tasks and with unpredicted
reward (83 and 37 neurons, respectively). Most neurons that met these
criteria showed the typical phasic activation after unexpected reward,
which was used as fourth criterion for inclusion. Further details on identifi-
cation of dopamine neurons are found in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
During recording, each trial began with a fixation point at the center of the
monitor. The animal directed its gaze to it and held it for 0.5 s. Then the fix-
ation point disappeared and a cue predicting a gamble occurred. Gambles
alternated pseudorandomly (see below). The cue remained on the screen
for 1.5 s. One of the two possible gamble outcomes was delivered at cue
offset. Unsuccessful central fixation resulted in a 6 s timeout. There was
no behavioral requirement after the central fixation time had ended. Trials
were interleaved with intertrial intervals of pseudorandom durations con-
forming to a truncated Poisson distribution (l = 5, truncated between 2
and 8 s.). We normally recorded 150–180 trials per neuron and two to three
neurons per day.
Cue presentation order was determined by drawing without replacement
from the entire pool of trials that we hoped to record. This procedure
ensured that we acquired sufficient trials per condition and made it very
difficult to predict which cuewould come next. Indeed, we saw no indication
in the behavior or neural data (Figure S3) that the animals could predict up-
coming cue. The order of unpredicted reward was determined in the same
way. In monkey A, we tested reward magnitudes of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.1, and 1.2 ml. In monkey B, this particular test was
done before we knew the final reward range we would establish utility func-
tions for, and so we tested reward magnitudes 0.11, 0.18, 0.22, 0.3, 0.35,
0.44, 0.59, 0.68, 0.75, 0.84, 0.9, and 1 ml.
We analyzed neuronal data in three task epochs after onsets of fixation
spot, cue, and juice. We constructed peristimulus time histograms (PSTHs)
by aligning the neuronal impulses to task events and then averaging across
multiple trials. The impulse rates were calculated in nonoverlapping time
bins of 10 ms. PSTHs were smoothed using a moving average of 70 ms
for display purposes. Quantitative analysis of neuronal data employed
defined time windows that included the major positive and negative
response components following fixation spot onset (100–400ms), cue onset
(100–550 ms in monkeys A and B), and juice delivery (50–350 ms and 50–
450 ms in monkeys A and B, respectively). For the analysis of neuronal
response to juice, we aligned the neuronal response in each trial type to
the prediction error time for that trial type. Because each gamble was pre-
dicting two possible amounts of juice (onset of which occurred 1.5 s after
cue), the onset of juice delivery should not generate a prediction error. How-
ever, the continuation of juice delivery after the time necessary for the deliv-
ery of the smaller possible juice reward should generate a positive predic-
tion error. Thus, the prediction error occurred at the time at which the
smaller reward with each gamble (would have) ended (see Figures S3Gand S3H). For example, the 0.4 ml juice was the larger outcome of a gamble
between 0.1 and 0.4 ml of juice, and hence the dopamine responses were
aligned to the prediction error occurring after the solenoid duration that
would have delivered 0.1 ml of juice (w25 ms). Consistent with this, dopa-
mine prediction error responses to reward appeared with longer delay in tri-
als involving gambles with larger EVs (Figure S3I). Analysis of responses to
varying sizes of unpredicted juice outside of the task employed a later time
window that captured the differential neuronal responses to reward with
different sizes (200–500 ms and 300–600 ms in monkeys A and B, respec-
tively). We measured the effect size between the neuronal responses to
each reward size versus the baseline firing rate of neurons for Figures 3C
and 3D (bottom) with Hedge’s g. Hedge’s g around 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 indicate
small, medium, and large effects, respectively. The confidence intervals for
the effect size indicating significant deviation from g = 0 were obtained by
bootstrapping with 100,000 permutations.
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